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Abstract: 
This paper continues the defense of a version of scientific realism, Tautological Scientific 
Realism (TSR), that rests on the claim that, excluding some areas of fundamental physics 
about which doubts are entirely justified, many areas of contemporary science cannot be 
coherently imagined to be false other than via postulation of radically skeptical scenarios, 
which are not relevant to the realism debate in philosophy of science. In this paper we 
discuss, specifically, the threats of meaning change and reference failure associated with 
the Kuhnian tradition, which depend on a descriptivist approach to meaning, and we 
argue that descriptivism is not the right account of the meaning and reference of 
theoretical terms. We suggest that an account along the lines of the causal-historical 
theory of reference provides a more faithful picture of how terms for unobservable 
theoretical entities and properties come to refer; we argue that this picture works 
particularly well for TSR. In the last section we discuss how our account raises concerns 
specifically for perspectival forms of SR. 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to continue the defense of a novel form of scientific realism, 
first sketched in Hoefer (2019).  Tentatively called “Tautological Scientific Realism” 
(TSR), the core ideas of this view are the following. (i) Scientific realism should exclude 
fundamental physics theories from its scope.  (ii) The dramatic leap forward in many of 
the sciences in the 20th century justifies a realist stance for many parts of science. By 
contrast, despite all the wonderful episodes contained therein, the history of science 
before the 20th century is no place to try to extend or defend the claims of scientific 
realism (SR). (iii) Many areas of contemporary science have attained such a level of 
interconnection (between different domains of knowledge) and such a variety of sources 
of confirmation that it is now simply no longer possible to coherently doubt the 
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approximate truth of the core “lore” in those areas, without doing so by means of one or 
another radical-skeptical scenario.1  And we believe it is almost tautological to maintain 
that if you have what seems to be a great deal of evidence in favor of some piece of 
scientific lore, and if you cannot see any coherent way to doubt the at least approximate 
truth of it without resorting to postulating some radical-skeptical scenario (evil demons, 
brains in a vat, the world as computer simulation, etc.), then you should indeed believe it.  
Hence, TSR. 
After giving a statement and some defense of the core ideas of TSR in section 2, we will 
go on in sections 3 and 4 to examine how to handle one of the great bugbears of scientific 
realism:  the threats of meaning change and reference failure that come out of the 
Kuhnian tradition and which depend on a descriptivist understanding of how terms like 
‘phlogiston’ and ‘electrons’ refer, when they do.  We argue that descriptivism is not the 
right account of the semantics of scientific kind terms and property terms, and argue that 
an account along the lines of the causal-historical approach to reference, an account that 
fits TSR especially well, gives the correct picture. Thus, it is possible to show that the 
threat of our still being, unbeknownst to us, engaging in empty talk about nothing when 
we say things about electrons and viruses, is a mere chimera. In section 5 we will address 
how our arguments and our account of reference bears on current doctrines of 
perspectival scientific realism.   
 
2. Tautological Scientific Realism 
Since scientific realism became a named philosophical viewpoint and an area of debate in 
Anglo-American philosophy of science, in the 1970s, a number of powerful and 
persuasive arguments have been mounted against its most prominent forms.  Why doesn’t 
it just die out?  Most philosophers have the experience, at one time or another, of 
recognizing the potency of anti-SR arguments and taking seriously the possibility that our 
best current science may be fundamentally wrong in many important ways, which will 
only be seen by future generations.  But then we go back to our daily lives, watching TV 
and using the internet, getting results from blood tests, taking antiviral medications and 
so forth.  And within days, we are once again thinking that scientific realism must be 
right, somehow, despite the opposing arguments. 
 
1 We find the word ‘lore’ to be a convenient term for the bits of knowledge that we want to talk about 
in explicating TSR.  ‘Lore’ has the right connotations:  long-established and accepted things, but ones 
which perhaps should not be assumed to be true.  By contrast, words like ‘knowledge’ and ‘fact’ carry 
the implication of truth, which is question-begging in the context of discussing and defending SR. 
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A nearly universal reaction to the forceful arguments against SR has been to go selective: 
to defend that some parts of our best science must be correct, or correct in a certain 
respect, even if truth-or-approximate-truth cannot be defended across the board.  
Structural realism urges that mature sciences get right certain structural features of the 
world.  Psillos’ selective SR maintains that the parts of science that were operative in 
making correct novel predictions should be held (to have been, and to now be) true-or-
approximately-true.  Entity realists say that we can believe at least in the existence of 
certain unobservable theoretical entities, although not the theories in which they figure, 
once certain conditions obtain.2   
TSR is also a form of selective SR, but different from all the ones just mentioned.  In the 
first place, TSR notes that the most convincing examples of scientific revolutions that 
completely change our ontology and ideology in science, since the turn of the 20th 
century, have been exclusively in the domain of fundamental physics theory.3 Moreover, 
the foundations of current physics (quantum mechanics and quantum field theory, when 
taken at face value) are still incoherent, and most physicists as well as philosophers of 
physics expect that future revolutions will occur that radically change the ontology and 
ideology of the fundamental nature of matter and space or spacetime.  This being the state 
of things, the path of wisdom is to exclude our current best fundamental physics theories 
from the domain of stuff that SR wishes to claim is true-or-approximately-true.  Despite 
the amazing empirical successes of those theories, their contents - the theories, and to 
some extent at least the ontology - have to be put into a quarantine zone.4  TSR maintains 
that it is possible to quarantine off the still-dubitable parts of fundamental physics from 
the rest of contemporary science, and then defend an appropriately qualified truth claim 
for vast areas of the rest of our current science.  
The reason it is possible to defend the truth of many other areas of science has to do with 
another way in which TSR is selective.  TSR does not try to claim that we can find aspects 
of putatively successful theories from earlier centuries and argue that they were both true 
and maintained into current-day science.  Rather, TSR restricts its claim to the contents 
 
2 For critical discussion of selective realism, see Tulodziecki (2017). 
3 The Darwinian synthesis in biology, discovery of the mechanisms of heredity (DNA and RNA and 
other things), and some other major discoveries have occurred outside of physics, of course. But in 
these fields scientists were well aware beforehand that they did not have the truth or anything very 
close to it.  So the discoveries did not have the character of radical overthrow of earlier beliefs that one 
sees in some physics revolutions. 
4 We take the useful term ‘quarantine’ from Callender (2019). Callender is more pessimistic about the 
possibility of erecting a serviceable quarantine than we are.  See Hoefer (2019) for more detailed 
arguments for the need to exclude fundamental physics from the domain of applicability of SR. 
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of what we now consider to be established, known scientific truths. Roughly speaking, 
the most important parts of what we now regard as established became clear and 
stabilized by the mid-late 20th century.  In broad-brush terms, we can mention as part of 
this established lore some key parts of biology (basic facts about DNA and RNA and their 
role in cell reproduction, sexual reproduction, and evolution; numerous facts about 
bacteria and viruses and their role in illnesses; facts about how cells produce energy, how 
oxygen is transported from lungs to cells in multi-celled organisms, and so on).  We can 
also mention central parts of chemistry, lore that gives us a grasp on how atoms bind into 
molecules, what happens in a huge range of chemical reactions, and so forth.  We can also 
mention the core elements of electrical and electronic engineering, such as the 
knowledge that allowed us to make radios and amplifiers in the 1920s, transistors in the 
1960s, and digital memory chips and processor chips in the late 20th century.5    
Why is all of this lore not still uncertain, subject to refutation by future scientific 
revolutions? The key claim of TSR is this: once the varieties of evidence for, and the 
inter-entanglements between, bits of (putative) knowledge reach a certain richness and 
complexity, the only ways to genuinely conceive of the serious falseness of important 
parts of the accepted lore will all involve some sort of radical-skeptical scenario, such as 
Descartes’ evil demon/deceiver, or Putnam’s brain in a vat, or the more recent idea that 
we might be all parts of a hugely sophisticated computer simulation, or the apocalyptic 
worry that perhaps the laws of nature will suddenly disappear or change overnight.  But 
radical skeptical scenarios put into doubt every bit of our knowledge, not just scientific 
knowledge.  For the purposes of debates on SR in the context of philosophy of science, 
such scenarios can be legitimately set aside.  And if it is really not possible to see how the 
best-established lore of (many parts of) current science can be coherently doubted 
without adverting to a radical skeptical scenario, then realism is victorious.  This is what 
TSR claims to be, in fact, the case. 
It is easy, we hope, to see why it is intractably hard to imagine some central features of 
modern science outside of physics, involving unobservable entities and processes, being 
 
5 At this point some philosophers may object that we are just expressing our own subjective confidence 
in current science, and note that people in (say) the late 19th century might well have felt a similar 
confidence despite having an enormous number of beliefs that we now regard as false.  But we believe 
that, despite the occasional expressions of extreme confidence that can be found in some statements of 
some prominent scientists, in fact many scientists back then understood that their theories were 
incomplete and quite possibly false in important respects. An example of this would be Darwin’s 
acknowledgment that he did not know what the mechanisms of inheritance were.  An exploration of 
how the confidence of scientists in the late 20th century and beyond compares with the confidence of 
earlier generations is a project beyond the scope of this paper. 
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substantially mistaken.  Take for example our belief that viruses of many types exist, can 
be seen with high-powered microscopes, grown in lab cultures, and that they propagate 
“in the wild”, causing various diseases in multi-celled hosts.6  We have such an enormous 
variety of epistemic handles on viruses and their roles in causing diseases that to imagine 
their non-existence or that they exist but do not do any of the things we attribute to them 
ends up being just as hard as the fictional example Saul Kripke invented and used in 
Naming and Necessity:  imagining that cats turn out to all be robots rather than living 
organic beings native to the Earth.  To imagine our virus lore turning out to be 
substantially false requires setting up some scenario in which a dozen or more 
independent types of evidence about (and types of interaction we have with) viruses all 
turn out to be completely misleading. The putative story one tells for how this could be so 
will require adjustments in other pieces of accepted lore. For example, if we imagine 
trying to suppose that electron microscopes that we thought allowed us to image viruses 
systematically mislead us, we have to explain then why they appear to work so well for 
imaging and manipulating other things, like microscopic circuits we build for 
computation.7 These changes or reinterpretations would presumably necessitate still other 
changes, in further areas of lore.  In most cases, we suggest, a chain reaction would result 
that winds up forcing wholesale changes across most or all of our accepted lore; in effect, 
we would be pushed into a radical skeptical scenario of one kind or another as the only 
way to imagine carrying through the rejection of the initial piece of lore (that viruses 
with certain characteristics exist and cause diseases). If we set aside radical skeptical 
scenarios, such things are just not genuine epistemic possibilities.  Thus, the things that 
TSR enjoins us to go ahead and trust to be true-or-approximately-true are just the sorts of 
things we mentioned above that feature in our daily lives and which return us to feeling 
that SR must somehow be right, after the spell of anti-realist arguments wears off. 
 
6 Hoefer (2019) explores briefly the justification of TSR’s claim in the context of a couple of different 
pieces of scientific lore outside of fundamental physics. 
7 Note that the epistemic handles we have on a kind of entity such as viruses, are not simply bits of 
descriptive beliefs that we have about them (although our beliefs do of course play a role in how 
epistemic handles get established and how they relate to the things and facts that they are handles on). 
For example, electron microscopes – the things themselves and their behaviors, as well as our beliefs 
about them – constitute part of our epistemic handles on viruses. And the network of interactions 
involved in microscopy are also part of our epistemic handles on viruses, despite not all of them being 
about viruses in any direct sense. So epistemic handles include types of evidence about (or for) some 
thing or factual proposition; types of interaction with a thing; as well as ways of knowing and doing 
that are integrated into our web of beliefs and practices. 
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A couple of things are important to note about TSR.  First, TSR is unlike most earlier 
forms of SR in not relying, at all, on inference to the best explanation (IBE) for its central 
argument.  We think that the objections raised against IBE by van Fraassen and others are 
correct, and that SR must find a way to defend itself without relying on IBE.  The same 
goes for the closely related “no miracles argument” first offered by Putnam, in so far as it 
is read as enjoining us to believe in the approximate truth of our best scientific theories 
because such truth would be the best explanation for the success of those theories.  While 
the explanatory claim is perhaps correct, it is not enough to warrant belief in that 
approximate truth.  But there is another aspect of Putnam’s argument that lines up well 
with TSR:  the idea that it would require positing a miracle - or as we prefer to say, 
positing some radical skeptical scenario - to coherently imagine that many core aspects of 
contemporary science’s picture are not even approximately true. 
Second, we note that in its central claim, TSR is essentially a direct denial of one of the 
more recent challenges to SR, namely Kyle Stanford’s problem of unconceived 
alternatives (PUA) (Stanford (2006)).  The PUA challenges SR by pointing out that, on top 
of the historically already-known examples of also-successful-but-false theories that the 
history of science (and contemporary science, in the domain of fundamental physics) 
gives us, SR must contend with the possibility that the real truth of things is actually 
entirely out of our cognitive grasp so far.  How can we claim to be able to rule this out?  
And if we cannot, how can we sustain any significant form of SR? 
When it comes to fundamental physics, TSR freely admits that Stanford is right.  But at 
the same time, TSR insists that the content and domain of fundamental physics8 is unique 
in this regard, compared to the other highly established areas of physical and biological 
science. Moreover, and crucially, no matter what the hypothesized future physics looks 
like, it is not going to undercut the correctness of the coarse-grained lore of physics - 
things like the existence of various types of stable elementary atoms, that they are mostly 
composed of electrons, protons and neutrons in certain stable bound configurations, and 
so on.  At this point, given the enormous number of epistemic handles we have on these 
parts of physics lore, only a skeptical scenario could raise such doubts.  Thus, high school 
physics texts are not going to be radically re-written; just, perhaps, their prefaces or final 
 
8 We include much of cosmology in the ambit of fundamental physics that must be quarantined for 
now, because its fundamental posits and models are strongly connected with fundamental physical 
theories such as General Relativity, the Standard Model of particle/field physics, and sometimes even 
speculative quantum gravity theories. 
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chapters.  And the physics and chemistry that biologists need to learn in order to do their 
daily work will not have changed, for the most part at least, either.9 
The qualification ‘for the most part’ is crucial, because of course we cannot rule out that 
future physics makes possible effects in biology or chemistry that are currently 
considered physically impossible.  Perhaps cold fusion will turn out to be possible, or 
humans will be able to utilize EPR entanglement for telepathic communication faster 
than light.  No matter; the scientific stories about what’s going on in most everyday 
physical happenings, where we already have a reasonably complete story in place, will 
not be undermined by such novelties.  TSR’s claim is just that most of what scientists 
think they know with certainty, in large swaths of current science, is indeed true-or-
approximately-true.  TSR does not claim that current science already knows most of what 
there is to know. 
Returning to PUA, we maintain that it can thus be quarantined as well:  it is a serious 
problem only in the domain of fundamental physics. Now, in Stanford (2006) most of the 
discussion concerns unconceived alternatives in biology, especially the biology of 
inheritance of organismic traits.  But crucially, Stanford’s case studies come from the 
history of science, not from contemporary biology; and TSR makes no realist claim 
concerning the scientific theories of those earlier epochs.  Indeed, the defender of TSR 
can happily concede that unconceived (radically different, and superior) alternatives have 
indeed been generically possible throughout the history of science prior to the mid-late 
20th century.  What she denies is that one can legitimately induce that they are still 
possible, for certain areas of contemporary science.    
So far we have presented the main characteristics of TSR, and have motivated why we 
think it may be stronger than earlier forms of SR.  Now we turn to the discussion of how 
TSR can overcome apparent challenges to the truth of scientific claims, particularly 
claims about the existence of unobservable theoretical entities: challenges that arise from 
considerations of reference and meaning. 
 
3. The referential, existential threat to SR 
 
9 Note that this is not because either chemistry or biology can be said to be domains in which material 
things obey classical Newtonian physics.  In both sciences facts about ions, chemical bonds and a 
number of purely quantum effects are frequently relevant.  But those relevant facts can be captured in 
terms of the entities that we believe to be “here to stay” and their behaviors, which we claim to be 
included in the safe areas of physics lore. 
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Many philosophers have thought that considerations of meaning and reference for 
“theoretical” terms and terms for unobservable entities pose quite general threats to any 
non-trivial form of SR.  The overall worry can be summed up in slogan form.  When it 
comes to the unobservable entities and properties posited in modern scientific theories, 
What if it’s all just empty talk? Language-based considerations may lead us to think this is 
a serious worry, even today. 
Let’s start with meaning holism, championed by Quine and Davidson.  The idea is that 
the meaning of any term in language, whether it be ‘sofa’, ‘blue’, ‘oxygen’ or ‘electron’, is 
not specifiable in some tidy definitional way, but rather is at least in part a function of the 
entire web of beliefs and practices that are accepted by the pertinent culture using those 
words.  Therefore, when the beliefs and practices connected to a term change 
significantly - as they do, for example, across a scientific revolution that substantially 
changes the theory, world-view, and experimental practices in a science - the meaning of 
a word (say, ‘electron’, after the quantum revolution) is quite different than it was in the 
earlier epoch.10  Kuhn famously argued that the meaning of ‘mass’ changes so 
substantially in the shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian paradigms that the respective 
uses before/after the relativity revolution literally do not refer to the same property.  
If we are not careful, this view of meaning may lead us to think that if uses of ‘electron’ 
actually referred to anything in one epoch (either pre- or post-revolution), then they 
perforce cannot do so in the other.  As Putnam described the worry in the 1970s: 
Let us suppose they are right, and that 'electron' in Bohr’s theory (the Bohr-
Rutherford theory of the early 1900s) does not refer to what we now call electrons. 
Then it doesn't refer to anything we recognize in present theory, and, moreover, it 
doesn’t refer to anything from the standpoint of present theory (speaking from that 
standpoint, the only things Bohr could have been referring to were electrons, and 
if he wasn't referring to electrons he wasn't referring to anything). So if we use 
present theory to answer the question 'was Bohr referring when he used the term 
"electron" ?', the answer has to be 'no', according to Kuhn and Feyerabend. (1978, 
pp. 22-23, italics in the original) 
In an obvious extension of the worry, one might further think:  major theory changes 
keep happening in science, especially in physics where further revolutions are expected.  
 
10 Minor changes or adjustments in our web of beliefs, of course, happen all the time, and presumably 
not even Kuhn and Feyerabend would regard them as really changing the meanings of the connected 
words. 
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So it is quite reasonable to suspect that future physicists will look back on our uses of 
‘electron’ and judge that they were empty talk, referring to nothing.  And since those 
future physicists will be in a much better epistemic situation than us, we should be 
worried indeed, already, that our assertions about electrons today are mere empty prattle; 
which is to say, anti-realists are right.   
Now, nothing in the logic of the argument above depended on picking a term from 
physics, so in principle the threat applies to ‘virus’ and ‘human Y-chromosome’ just as 
much as ‘electron’.  Two things are worth remarking in this regard.   
(1) One of the core claims of TSR is that we have reason to suspect that there will not in 
the future be any revolutions in biology that substantially change the meanings of ‘virus’ 
or ‘human Y-chromosome’ (and, indeed, that we can’t conceive in any clear sense how 
such a revolution could occur).  This already partly defuses the Kuhn-Feyerabend-holist 
worry sketched above. 
(2) Since TSR is careful to exclude fundamental physics from its domain, one might think 
that we need not worry about physics revolutions changing the meaning of ‘electron’.  
But, recall, TSR keeps at least certain basic, now-deeply-entrenched bits of physics lore 
outside of the quarantine zone; and that includes the lore that tells us that electrons exist, 
have a certain quantity of negative charge, flow through wires in electric circuits and 
from cathode to anode in cathode ray tubes, and so on.  So we need to say more in order 
to protect our electrons from the present worry. 
Holism is not a very popular view these days.  But the core feature of holism that 
generates apparent problems for scientific realism, namely that the meaning (and hence 
reference, if any) of theoretical terms is given by associated descriptive content, is still 
defended by many, especially when it comes to terms for unobservable entities 
introduced in scientific theories.  In other words, any version of descriptivism about 
meaning can lead to essentially the same threat to SR.   
Chakravartty sketches the concern thus:  
Even in cases where successive theories ostensibly refer to the same kind of object 
(the electron, for example), changes in how it is described are sometimes so great 
that it may not seem entirely credible to maintain that each of these theories takes 
the same object as its subject matter. … Is it reasonable to assert that o exists, and 
yet be open to the possibility that one’s conception of o, in terms of the set of 
properties a theory associates with it, may change, perhaps greatly? (2007, pp. 63-
64) 
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For descriptivists, the meaning of a natural kind term or property term is typically given 
by a set of descriptions that are supposedly true of the denoted objects; or rather, if the 
term denotes anything in the world at all, it denotes whatever kind, entity or property is 
uniquely picked out by virtue of satisfying all, or some importance-weighted majority, of 
the associated descriptions.  It is easy to see that this raises a serious problem if, over time, 
the scientific community makes major changes in the descriptions it associates with a 
term.   
Descriptivism was for many years an almost universally accepted view of the meaning of 
any referential terms, singular or general; but the view was severely compromised by the 
arguments presented by Kripke in 1970, especially what have come to be known as the 
ignorance and error arguments. First, Kripke noted that speakers often associate to terms 
only descriptions that are insufficient to pick out a unique referent.  Focusing on proper 
names, Kripke famously argued that most speakers associate with ‘Feynman’ something 
like ‘famous physicist who worked at Caltech’, a description which applied to Gell-Mann 
also. Similarly, it is likely that many users of the word ‘platinum’ associated that term 
with ‘heavy, silver-colored, valuable metallic element’, which fails to distinguish 
platinum from several other elements. Second, speakers may also associate descriptions 
that pick out the wrong individual or kind, e.g. associating ‘first European to set foot in 
the New World’ with ‘Columbus’, or ‘light element which is a gas at normal room 
temperatures’ with ‘lithium’, when lithium actually is a solid. 
A variant of descriptivism has seemed, to some philosophers, able to evade Kripke’s 
ignorance and error arguments:  cluster descriptivism, first proposed in Searle (1958). 
According to cluster descriptivism, in a linguistic community a term is associated, not 
with a single description, but with a cluster of descriptions or attributes, and the 
reference of a use of the term is the individual or kind that uniquely satisfies a sufficient, 
weighted number of the properties in the cluster. The cluster need not be in each 
speaker’s head as long as the community as a whole has a rich enough cluster, which 
seems to resolve cases of ignorance; and the cluster may contain some false descriptions as 
long as there are sufficient correct ones and they are among those that have greatest 
weight, which seems to resolve cases of error.  But, as we argue in (2019), both ignorance 
and error arguments continue to afflict cluster descriptivism, even if the examples are less 
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ubiquitous.11 On the one hand the view falls prey to the ignorance argument. For 
example, when samples of platinum were first named by Europeans, any plausible cluster 
associated with the term would have applied also to at least palladium, and perhaps other 
metals as well. But the people who introduced and started to use the term were holding 
samples of platinum (with some impurities) in their hands and intending to refer to that 
substance and only that substance, and we think they succeeded. On the other hand, 
there is no guarantee that the cluster of beliefs associated with a term at any given 
moment in time will contain a core of weighty, correct beliefs about the extension of the 
term. The cluster of important characteristics initially ascribed to Megalosaurus by the 
early dinosaur researchers included these: amphibious, quadrupedal, and up to 22 meters 
long.  Later decades revealed that Megalosaurs were land animals, walked upright on 
their hind legs, and grew to only 6 meters or so in length (see Cadbury 2001). Whatever 
descriptive content remained that was correct, in the cluster we might ascribe to the 
dinosaur research community, was surely not enough to entail referential success 
according to cluster descriptivism. 
That there are changes in the cluster of beliefs we hold about kinds of things is obvious. 
That makes cluster descriptivism attractive, for cluster descriptivism seems to provide the 
required amount of flexibility that allows us to account for the preservation of referential 
continuity in spite of the change in our conceptions of things. The problem is that cluster 
descriptivism does not account adequately for continuity of reference and the problem 
arises when we confuse those flexible, clustery beliefs with reference-determining 
meanings. For, if the clusters change so much, and if the weights of the beliefs are shifted 
substantially, how are we to say, for instance, that previous members of the community 
were talking about the same things and kinds of things we do, and that they were wrong 
about the properties they attributed to them? The problems that the Kuhn-Feyerabend 
view raises for any form of realism come back in full force.  
Granted, there are cases in which things work the way descriptivism or cluster 
descriptivism predict, cases where we realize that our conceptions were so muddled that 
we conclude there was nothing we were definitely referring to. The case of ‘phlogiston’ 
readily comes to mind. Some cases do work that way, but some others do not. 
Descriptivist theories maintain that reference is only possible via the mediation of a 
definite description or a cluster of descriptions that select the referent, and if nothing 
 
11 In Hoefer & Martí (2019) we argue that ignorance and error arguments continue to afflict more 
recent and sophisticated versions of cluster descriptivism, such as that advocated in Häggqvist & 
Wikforss (2018). 
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satisfies the description or the properly weighted cluster, reference fails. That is the way 
reference is always determined, according to descriptivists. But that is not how things 
always work, so we need an account that opens the door to the possibility that reference 
can be determined independently of the satisfaction of descriptions associated with terms.  
It might be argued though that our confidence in the continuity of reference in spite of 
cases of substantial error or of ignorance is based on the fact that the cases that come to 
mind (platinum, Megalosaurus) are typically kinds of things with observable samples or 
that have left observable traces that are crucial in grounding reference. The case of 
‘electron’, obviously, is rather different. But we will argue that descriptivism or cluster 
descriptivism does not give us the right account of reference in that kind of case either, so 
an alternative non-descriptivist account is required in the case of reference to, at least 
some, non-observable entities or phenomena.  In the rest of this section we will examine 
the problems of descriptivist reference for unobservables such as electrons, and in the 
next section we explore how reference to the unobservables that TSR urges us to believe 
in does get established. 
In the SR literature we keep coming back to the case of the electron because it illustrates 
so clearly the concern that can be raised about referential continuity across multiple, 
important theory changes.  When J.J. Thomson talked about electrons in discussing his 
famous experiments, while accepting his Nobel prize in 1906, was he really talking about 
the same things as a modern physicist who mentions electrons while explaining the basic 
fermions in a graduate course on the Standard Model? We say yes, but under 
descriptivism it may not be possible to say this.12  Ignorance and error problems threaten 
descriptivist reference to electrons in various ways.   
Thomson and his peers in 1906 might have described the electron as a particle that 
composes cathode rays, has a certain constant mass and a certain constant negative charge 
(the exact values of which were not yet known), and contributes to making up atoms. So 
far, so good (by late 20th-century lights), we see here four bits of description that are still 
correct by modern lights. 
But if we imagine pressing Thomson and his peers with further questions, things become 
murkier.  We might ask “Do electrons have definite positions at all moments of time, and 
 
12 Under Kuhnian holism it is clearly not so.  Multiple very important changes in belief about the 
electron, and about the nature of fundamental particles in general - as well as about mass, space, time, 
energy and more - occurred in physics between 1906 and, say, 1976, by which time the Standard 
Model was clearly established.  Some descriptivists, anti-realist descriptivists, would of course be 
happy to side with Kuhn on this point. 
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follow continuous trajectories through space?”, to which they would surely have 
answered “Yes, of course.”, whereas a contemporary physicist would answer “Definitely 
not!”  We might go on and ask Thomson and his peers:  “Does an electron have a wave-
like nature?  Does it have intrinsic angular momentum? Might it have further internal 
structure or sub-components?”  They would probably have answered these questions (not 
without a certain level of irritation and bewilderment) with No, No, Maybe but I doubt 
it.  The 1976 physics lecturer, however, would answer these questions as follows:   Yes, 
Yes, Certainly not.  This is a substantial amount of disagreement, about things physicists 
of both eras would agree are extremely important, fundamental, properties that electrons 
either do or do not have!  Here we see the error argument looming. 
And there are other illustrations of how large the shadow of the error argument looms. 
Referential continuity across multiple revolutions is implicitly assumed for all the 
particles discovered in the late 19th century and first half of the 20th (protons, neutrons, 
positrons, various mesons, etc.) despite sometimes major shifts in beliefs about their 
nature. To mention just two: protons went from being assumed fundamental to being 
thought to be composed of three quarks; and throughout a substantial portion the 20th 
century, neutrinos were supposed to be massless. That property was at the very core of 
the characterization of neutrinos. It was quite a surprise to find out in 1998 that neutrinos 
had, after all, mass. But no one thinks (we hope) that neutrinos do not exist, or that we 
were not referring to neutrinos before 1998, merely on the basis of the fact that, as far as 
we can tell, nothing satisfies the description neutrinos were long thought to satisfy, nor 
even just the set of the weightiest, (allegedly) definitory properties associated with 
‘neutrino’.13 
Going back to Thomson and electrons, a cluster descriptivist might argue that referential 
continuity exists between Thomson’s day and ours, if she maintains that the core, central, 
most important bits of description attached to the term ‘electron’ are: “composes cathode 
rays, has a certain constant mass and a certain constant negative charge, and contributes 
to making up atoms”.  The last three, at least, would be reckoned as indeed central, and 
the middle two (constant mass and charge, as per the now-known values) even essential 
to being an electron, by physicists today. 
 
13 Neutrinos may belong to the quarantine zone of fundamental physics rather than the 
safe/established part, and if so one is free to doubt their existence for the same reasons that one doubts 
other elements of fundamental theory. Our point is that we hope no one doubts the existence of 
neutrinos because they considered, before 1998, ‘Neutrinos have no mass’ to be true by definition.  We 
thank Ana Maria Cretu for drawing our attention to the example of neutrinos. For discussion of 
potential implications of this case for essentialism, see Cretu (2018). 
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We have two responses to this.  First, the mere fact that we can, with hindsight, pick out 
a “core” set of descriptive associations for ‘electron’ that were not false and that were 
sufficient to uniquely pick out electrons, will not do. If it is to be a genuine theory of 
reference, descriptivism must allow the “core” of highest-weighted descriptions to be 
specified prospectively, not with 70 years’ hindsight; in other words, the descriptions in 
the cluster have to be the descriptions that the users of the term, at the time, do associate 
with the term, and consider to be “core” or “weightiest”.  It is by no means clear that 
Thomson and his peers would have nominated each of these four descriptions of electrons 
to be part of the core, or that they would not have added further descriptions now known 
to be false. 
Second, it is not hard to slightly fictionalize the early history of the electron so as to make 
the situation impossible to salvage under descriptivism.  Imagine that Thomson and other 
physicists had had the view (based on perhaps a too-direct reading of experimental 
results?) that the mass and charge of electrons are variable within a certain range, rather 
than uniformly all the same.  And imagine that the consensus had been, for some years, 
what certain prominent physicists did think at first: that electrons are not components of 
atoms.  But otherwise, let’s stipulate, most of the experimental knowledge is the same as it 
was in the late-1800s.  Then the only non-false (by late 20th century lights) descriptions in 
the core/cluster of beliefs held by Thomson and his peers in 1906 might have been:  
negatively charged particle that comprises cathode rays.  And now the ignorance 
argument bites, because in the cathode ray tubes of the day, there were also various 
negatively charged ions traveling from cathode to anode or screen (Broadway & Pearce 
(1939)). Even ignoring the erroneous parts of the cluster, the true component left would 
not pick out electrons uniquely.   
Any form of descriptivism will have trouble arguing that fictional-Thomson and his peers 
referred to anything at all when they talked about ‘electrons’, if we today are more or less 
right in our beliefs about what we call ‘electrons’.  But we think that fictional-Thomson 
and his peers would still have been talking about electrons, just as we are today, despite 
the many false beliefs we would say they had concerning them. The intuition that this is 
right is not substantially weaker, we think, in the fictional history scenario than it is in 
the real scenario described earlier.  
There is no denying that in the very early history of the use of ‘electron’ there may have 
been, and in fact was, referential indeterminacy, and any adequate theory of reference 
needs to make room for that. In fact, and as we will argue in the next section, accepting 
some degree of indeterminacy is crucial in order to understand the complexity of the 
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establishment of a referential practice. But by 1906 Thomson and his peers were 
definitely referring to electrons, insufficient or erroneous characterizations 
notwithstanding. 
Finally, it is worth remarking that, just as it is easy to craft a situation in which the 
majority of descriptions associated with ‘electron’ in the early years after the introduction 
of the term are false, it is also easy to imagine - at a superficial level, at any rate - future 
revolutions that render false a majority of the descriptions we now associate with 
‘electron’.  How could this be?  Well, we may imagine that a future theory attributes 
internal structure to electrons after all, and also postulates a slow change, over cosmic 
time, in the mass/charge ratio of the electron and most other massive particles.  Worse, 
future theory might tell us that electrons actually come in two subspecies with distinct 
internal structural features that lead to slightly distinct, but very similar, observable 
properties.  (One of the two subspecies might be vanishingly rare in our solar system, 
explaining why past experiments never clearly revealed the existence of both sub-kinds.)  
And so forth.   
To be clear, we do not claim that these future twists in the story of the electron are 
actually genuinely conceivable (without adverting to radical skeptical scenarios), i.e., that 
a real possible-physics with these features, empirically at least as adequate as current 
physics, exists in conceptual space. We merely claim that, given the actual history of 
physics in the past two centuries, it would be rash to claim that this can be ruled out with 
certainty.  This, of course, is why - according to TSR - fundamental physics theory 
belongs in the quarantine zone.  What is not any longer in the quarantine zone according 
to TSR is the fact of the existence of electrons, and the rough or approximate truth of the 
basic lore concerning them; we have too many epistemic handles on these facts to be able 
to conceive their falsehood without invoking radical skeptical scenarios.14  
In sum, descriptivism plays into the hands of scientific anti-realism by raising the 
prospect that Thomson was perhaps not talking about anything real at all when he wrote 
his famous papers on electrons, and – worse – that the same may still be true for us when 
we talk about electrons.  Cluster descriptivism may seem to provide a way to elude the 
danger, but in fact it does not. But if descriptivism is not the right way to understand how 
terms for unobservable entities refer, what is?  How does the reference of a word like 
‘electron’ get established?  
 
14 As we will argue below, we should not give in to the temptation of thinking that those epistemic 
handles form a kind of descriptivist cluster.  As mentioned above, epistemic handles are not simply 
bits of descriptive knowledge; this will be clarified further in section 4. 
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4. Reference to theoretical natural kind and property terms 
Neither classical nor cluster-descriptivism gives us a correct account of the reference of 
terms, including theoretical terms.  The alternative to descriptivism is the so-called 
causal-historical approach, originally introduced by Kripke (1980), Donnellan (1970) and 
Putnam (1973), and later developed by Michael Devitt in his (1981) and other works.  
The causal-historical approach works well for proper names and for natural kind terms 
denoting observable, easily ostendible medium-sized goods.  Moreover, it has seemed to 
be attractive also as an account of reference to unobservable entities and magnitudes, 
because while such things cannot be easily ostended, it has always been part of the 
causal-historical approach that terms can be introduced via definite descriptions (as in the 
case of ‘Neptune’ discussed by Kripke). And once a term is introduced, whether by 
baptism, ostension of paradigmatic samples, or by description, the capacity to refer is 
passed on, and maintained through the subsequent chain of users of the term, so that even 
if theories later change (as happened in the case of electrons), it is easy to maintain that 
users of the term are still talking about the same things.  In some cases, the introduction 
of a term may involve both description and ostension, e.g. Benjamin Franklin might have 
introduced ‘electricity’ by the description: “Whatever physical kind or process underlies 
these phenomena” (ostending lightning and the subsequent discharge phenomena 
induced in his famous kite experiments). 
But many philosophers of science have worried that the causal-historical approach goes 
too far in the direction away from descriptivism, making reference too easy and causing 
different problems with prominent cases in the history of science. ‘Phlogiston’ is usually 
invoked in this regard.  Common sense dictates that ‘phlogiston’ never referred to 
anything at all; but if it had been introduced by means of the description “substance 
crucially involved in combustion phenomena”, then arguably it would have referred to 
oxygen – making subsequent decades of scientific debate into complete nonsense 
(unbeknownst to the participants in the debate and the experimental work).  This 
example is typically taken to show that one cannot avoid introducing theoretical 
descriptions of a more detailed and robust kind into the story of how reference to 
unobservable theoretical entities and magnitudes is established (see for example Kroon 
(1985), Psillos (1999, 2012)).  
In this section we will defend the causal-historical approach to the reference of terms for 
theoretical entities. We will use as a foil the causal descriptivism defended in Psillos 
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(2012), a hybrid account that combines aspects of descriptivism and aspects of the causal-
historical picture. The reason to focus on Psillos’ approach is that it is, in principle, 
especially promising: on the one hand, the incorporation of some descriptivist tenets is 
meant to free the theory of reference from the excessive referential success that is 
supposed to plague the causal-historical approach and, on the other hand, the 
incorporation of aspects of the causal-historical picture seems to allow the view to evade 
the problems that affect descriptivism.15 However, as we will argue, Psillos’ approach is 
still vulnerable to the kinds of problems that cluster descriptivism faces. We will argue 
that TSR meshes perfectly with the causal-historical approach and resolves the concerns 
that have been raised about its ability to work well for theoretical terms for unobservable 
entities and magnitudes. 
According to Psillos, two conditions must be satisfied for a theoretical term t to refer to 
an entity or magnitude x:  (a)  x must be the cause of a phenomenon φ (intuitively, the 
phenomenon scientists wish to explain with the help of t); (b) x satisfies a description 
D(x) that captures the ways in which the posited referent is supposed to be causally 
connected to the phenomenon φ.16  When t is introduced, reference is not successfully 
established unless both conditions are satisfied: 
If causal description D(x) is satisfied by some entity x, but x is not the cause of φ, 
then t does not refer to it. Conversely, if something does indeed cause φ, but D(x) is 
not satisfied by this something, then t does not refer to it.17  (p. 222) 
The causal-historical approach to reference has two distinct parts: one of them deals with 
the introduction of the term, the other one deals with its subsequent uses. Psillos’ 
proposed referential mechanism is clearly meant to apply to the introduction of a term t. 
It is not entirely clear to us whether Psillos means for the two conditions to apply in 
subsequent uses, down the chain of communication so to speak, so that, whenever the 
 
15 A number of  philosophers have argued that a causal component to the account of reference is 
needed to avoid problems of referential failure or problems of referential continuity; see, for example, 
Newton-Smith (1981) chapter 7. 
16 Are (a) and (b) explicitly held in the mind of the introducer of the term t? Or are they in the minds 
of the relevant community (whether explicitly or implicitly)?  We will assume the latter, since it 
seems to be the most plausible way of interpreting the proposal.  We believe that nothing in our 
discussion will depend on this question.   
17 Notice that causation appears in both of Psillos’ conditions, and this seems to be his reason for 
describing his view as a form of “causal descriptivism”.  Psillos’ account is nonetheless quite different 
from some earlier accounts of reference that have gone by the same moniker, for example in Lewis 
(1984) and Jackson (1998), but is somewhat closer to Kroon (1987). We will not discuss the earlier 
causal descriptivism; for criticism, see Raatikainen (2006) and Martí (2020).  
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term t is uttered, it will refer to x only if the two conditions are satisfied, no matter how 
much the beliefs that the community associates with t have changed. Some of the things 
Psillos says seem to suggest that this is so and, in fact, continuity of reference would seem 
to require that both conditions, i.e., x causing φ and x satisfying D, be in place.  However, 
some of Psillos’ remarks suggest that although condition (a) definitely has to be correct 
and retained, there can be refinements and changes in D(x) over time, and that it may 
contain some erroneous parts at first.18 Psillos recalls David Papineau’s elegant way of 
putting the distinction between core parts of D(x) which presumably must be retained 
(the ‘Yes’ parts), those that may or may not be retained (‘Perhaps’), and those descriptions 
that definitely do not belong in D(x) (‘No’).  We claim that, as long as there is a core part 
of D(x) that must be correct on pain of referential failure, the view is vulnerable to the 
typical problems descriptivist views face.  
Recall our fictional-Thomson from section 3.  All of his central beliefs about electrons 
were incorrect, except for the belief that that they were negatively charged and present 
in cathode rays. Even if we take the relevant phenomenon φ associated with ‘electron’ to 
have been cathode rays, we noted that there were other negatively charged particles in 
the rays at that time, negative ions of various atoms and compounds.  So this may be seen 
as a case of referential indeterminacy or reference failure, and Psillos’ causal descriptivism 
does not deliver the desired referential continuity in this case.  Admittedly, this is a 
fictional case, but other problematic cases are not hard to find in real history of science. 
Consider again the case of neutrinos.  At the time of its introduction, ‘neutrino’ seems to 
fail to meet both of Psillos’ conditions, (a) and (b).  Regarding (a), neutrinos were not 
introduced as the cause of any phenomenon φ; they were introduced to “balance the 
books” of conservation principles, being the bearers of the energy and angular 
momentum that seemed to be missing in beta decay processes.  To say that neutrinos 
cause energy conservation, or cause it to not be violated, would be an abuse of language.19 
But there was no other known, observable phenomenon of which neutrinos were 
thought to be the cause, to play the role of φ in (a). Regarding (b), neutrinos were initially 
 
18 See his discussion of the history of chlorine, pp. 227-228. 
19 In so far as physicists think of anything as being a cause of energy conservation, it would be the 
time-translation symmetry of the fundamental Lagrangians of particle physics, or perhaps the time-
translation symmetry of spacetime’s structure. 
     A similar issue regarding condition (a) arises for the introduction of ‘Higgs boson’:  it is not 
introduced as the cause of fact that some elementary particles have mass; the word usually used is 
‘responsible’.  Even if this can be understood as causation in some extremely broad sense, it clearly is 
not the kind of causal contact between the named entity and the namer that is meant to help ground 
reference according to causal descriptivists. 
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thought to have either zero or very low rest mass; but theoretical developments in the 
1940s and experimental results in the 1950s seemed to show that neutrinos must have 
zero rest mass (Murayama 2002). By the late 1950s, this property would have been put 
into the ‘Yes’ part of any plausible D(x) capturing the community’s beliefs, so this looks 
like a potential case in which the “refinement” of D(x) leads to referential failure.20   
Restoring to descriptions a crucial role in the determination of reference solves the 
specific problem that ‘phlogiston’ raises, but it risks creating potential new problems with 
historical (and contemporary) cases. Moreover, it sacrifices one of the key insights of the 
causal-historical approach:  that once reference is up and running, we can coherently 
imagine discovering that any description that scientists had in mind at the time of 
introducing a term turns out to be incorrect. But, how does reference get up and running? 
We contend  that the causal-historical approach has all the resources required to handle 
reference to theoretical terms for unobservable entities and magnitudes.   
First of all, we need to set aside a couple of misconceptions concerning the causal-
historical approach that have made it appear less flexible than it actually is.  One concerns 
the sense in which causation is involved.  The causation involved concerns reference 
transmission, i.e., how reference in later uses depends on the existence of a causal chain 
of reference-borrowing that leads back to the period of uses that fix or establish 
reference.  There is no requirement that the entity or magnitude named by a new term 
“be the cause” of the introduction, in any sense, nor that it be the cause of some 
phenomenon, the desire to explain which prompts the introduction – although 
sometimes one or both of these things will be the case.  And this means, secondly, that as 
Raatikainen (2007) stresses, the causal-historical approach is perfectly compatible with a 
term being introduced with only a definite description initially offered to fix the term’s 
reference, as in the famous example of Neptune.21 
But if a theoretical term is introduced purely by means of a description, doesn’t this mean 
that on the causal-historical approach, the term forever more designates whatever entity 
satisfies the description (if any), and hence that the description cannot fail to apply?  No, 
 
20 Psillos’ remarks about the changes in D(x) over time make this concern particularly acute, because 
he thinks that “Ultimately, the reference should be fixed by the kind-constitutive properties …” (p. 
228), and having rest mass (or not) is surely a kind-constitutive property for fundamental particles.   
21 It is true that Michael Devitt (1981) offers an account in which both the introduction and the 
transmission are causal. But as he himself points out (2015) the account is meant to apply to paradigm 
proper names and natural kind terms that have ostendable samples. And even in those cases, Devitt 
agrees, the names in question can be introduced via a definite description, a description that 
nevertheless does not play any role in the transmission of the capacity to refer. 
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because the establishment of reference, getting a referential practice up and running in a 
linguistic community, is in most cases a process that takes place over a period of time, not 
something accomplished at the very moment of introduction of a term.  As Martí (2015) 
puts it, 
… we should not think that bestowing a name is an act; it is a process. It 
requires success in launching a practice, and launching practices is not 
something that occurs instantly. … The fact that the idealized picture of 
naming presented by Donnellan and Kripke focuses on the very simple cases 
where there is a dubbing ceremony should not distract us from the variety of 
cases in which the process of introducing a name in a language is 
considerably more complex … (p. 87) 
If this is true for the case of proper names, as we believe it is, imagine how much more 
scope for complexity there is in the establishment of reference for theoretical terms for 
unobservable entities and magnitudes! 
Many things can happen after a term is first introduced, whether the introduction 
involved only descriptive beliefs, or rather some element of ostension (“Let’s call the 
things making those trails in our cloud chamber ‘t’.”), or some combination of both (and 
perhaps more). Once we abandon the idea that introducing a name (be it of a person or an 
unobservable) consists in a single well-defined act of naming, and we embrace the view 
that reference-establishment is a process, it is much easier to account for that enormous 
complexity. It is our view that the causal-historical approach should, and can easily, 
incorporate the idea of naming as a process and thus be able to handle paradigmatic cases 
of referential failure, success, and continuity in the history of science.22 
If a theoretical term is introduced with only a description, then at that point reference 
may be so far not established (if the description picks out nothing real – e.g., ‘phlogiston’ 
and ‘substance given off by things that burn in the process of combustion’); or it may be 
tentatively established (e.g., ‘Neptune’, ‘large planet beyond Uranus whose gravitational 
effects on Uranus explain the discrepancies in its orbit given Newtonian gravity’), but this 
is not the end of the story.  Even starting from such an impoverished position, scientists 
invariably have further ideas about how to find out about the named thing – how to 
produce it, for example, or block it, or how to determine its mass; what other effects it 
 
22 That the introduction and establishment of a theoretical term is an extended process and also a 
complicated one, with many twists and turns before clarity and stability are eventually achieved, will 
be no news to historians of science who study the history of how ‘oxygen’, ‘electron’ and many other 
scientific terms came to have an established use. 
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may produce; and so forth.  As the community goes about its business, theorizing and 
experimenting and observing, some of these ideas may lead to the community achieving 
new epistemic handles on the entity. When things go well, those epistemic handles will 
both solidify the community’s belief in the existence of the entity, and potentially also 
change the community’s beliefs about the entity’s nature and properties. It is the 
achievement of consensus about the epistemic handles we have on an entity that makes 
for an established referential practice.  But by the time that is achieved, or at some later 
time, the first descriptions associated with the term may be dropped from the 
community’s beliefs.  For example, perhaps some day physicists will discover, and 
announce, that “The Higgs boson turns out to have nothing to do with the origins of 
mass!” – even though the Higgs was introduced to explain why W and Z gauge bosons 
have mass, much as ‘Neptune’ was introduced to name the theorized planet that 
explained anomalies in the orbit of Uranus. This is perfectly imaginable if in the future 
the production of Higgs bosons in particle accelerators becomes routine, and our 
manipulations of them become entangled with other phenomena and other practices; 
those epistemic handles might come to be much more important to physicists’ referential 
practices involving ‘Higgs boson’ than the initial theoretical description assigning the 
Higgs boson (or field) responsibility for the fact that certain particles have rest mass.23 
Epistemic handles play two crucial roles in our approach. On the one hand, they are 
fundamental to our defense of TSR: when they are numerous and diverse enough, they 
give the scientific community grounds to be certain of the truth of some belief or the 
existence of some entity. On the other hand, they play a role in the way in which a 
referential practice becomes consolidated in a community. This role is not necessarily one 
that guarantees the existence of the entity, or the truth of the community’s beliefs about 
it!  Rather, the epistemic handles that contribute to established referential practices 
ensure that the community has some agreed forms of evidence for the existence of the 
entity or magnitude named by the term, and agreed ways for gathering further evidence 
for it or information about it.  These “ways of knowing” may include things like: 
microscopes to visually image it; detectors to detect its presence or measure its properties; 
“factories” to produce more of it; and indirect effects that its existence or presence should 
 
23 Note that in this scenario, our current theoretical description of the Higgs turns out to have been 
wrong, in line with TSR’s insistence that fundamental physics theory is still in quarantine.  It might be 
correct to say, in this scenario, that the Higgs particle is no longer in the quarantine zone, as we have 
asserted above regarding electrons – we do not have to take a stand on this question.  Even if it would 
be correct to regard the Higgs particle as out of quarantine, this would not imply that the (updated) 
theoretical beliefs about it also have that status.  
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induce, where we have ways of observing or knowing whether these effects occur.  And 
clearly, this list is not exhaustive. 24   
But even when a community has enough handles on a theoretical entity or magnitude to 
clearly meet the threshold for having an established referential practice, it may not yet 
have enough handles, with enough interconnection to other parts of the community’s 
knowledge, to make the entity or magnitude’s existence indubitable in the sense of TSR. 
Before a referential practice is established for a theoretical term, our approach makes 
room for both indeterminacy of reference and referential failure, even for a term that, 
like ‘oxygen’ or ‘neutrino’, will eventually be successful. Referential indeterminacy is a 
real phenomenon and it has to be acknowledged and accounted for by any theory of 
reference. Indeterminacy may arise in more than one way. There are cases in which it 
may be entirely unclear, even with hindsight,  whether a term referred in the early stages 
of its use and, if so, to what. The word ‘oxygen’, introduced by Lavoisier, may illustrate 
this phenomenon, since at the beginning Lavoisier believed that he was dubbing a 
substance that was the principle of generation of acids, which is false, and of course he 
had no idea that the oxygen generated as the end product of certain chemical processes 
was a diatomic molecule (O2) rather than a type of elementary atom, or even a continuous 
fluid substance.  
TSR acknowledges the existence of temporary referential indeterminacy and, in our view, 
so does the causal-historical picture, even though the simple examples that its proponents 
have often used, with their insistence on dubbing ceremonies, obscure that fact. Some 
aspects of the ‘Madagascar’ case, often discussed in the literature on proper names, exhibit 
the same kind of temporary referential indeterminacy. Since no official dubbing of the 
island occurred (and there was a previous time when ‘Madagascar’ was used, but not as 
the name of the island), it is likely that there was some period of time for which we ought 
to say that it is not entirely clear what a particular utterance of the name referred to. 
Nowadays things are settled and it is entirely clear what ‘Madagascar’ refers to, but a grey 
area, a period of indeterminacy, needs to be accepted. Michael Devitt (1981, 2015) has 
 
24 As we have noted earlier, epistemic handles are not simply bits of descriptive knowledge or beliefs 
(see footnotes 7 and 14). A proponent of cluster descriptivism might argue that the handles can be 
described, and hence those descriptions can be part of a descriptive cluster. The answer to this is that 
anything can be described.  The interactions of the parts of an automobile engine can be described, but 
the descriptions are not what make the car move.  Epistemic handles can be described, but it is the 
handles themselves, not descriptions of them, that play a role in established referential practices (and 
in our knowledge more generally).   
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explained the ‘Madagascar’ case from the causal-historical point of view in terms of 
multiple grounding and partial reference. Even mistakes can ground reference anew, 
providing a new reference for an old name. The consolidation of the grounding is a 
process, and processes hardly ever have clear dividing lines.   
Let’s now come back to the case that was supposed to be difficult for the causal-historical 
approach: phlogiston. The word was introduced with an attempted initial fix on its 
reference via a description, something like ‘substance whose presence in certain materials 
explains their combustibility, and which is given off by those materials during 
combustion’.  This description does not pick out anything, of course.  Certain experiments 
and alleged connections of phlogiston with other phenomena (such as metallic 
appearance) led to the creation of some putative epistemic handles on phlogiston.25  But 
these handles unraveled as further experimental knowledge increased, which is why an 
established referential practice was never achieved and the community eventually settled 
on the view that phlogiston does not exist.  This historical case is extremely interesting, 
but we do not see anything in it that challenges either TSR or the causal-historical 
approach to reference for theoretical terms, as we understand it.26 
Of course since the success of reference to an unobservable depends, on our view, on 
many factors that are external to the minds of users, the approach would seem to face a 
serious problem which can be put in the form of a question: how does one identify what 
one is talking about, and even whether one is talking about anything at all? The point of 
the approach is precisely that ‘one’ does not identify it. If a term that has been introduced 
has connected successfully to something, and the term is being passed to other links in 
the chain of communication that use it, as the approach holds, with the intention to refer 
 
25 These putative epistemic handles correspond to the reasons often cited by scientific anti-realists for 
the claim that phlogiston theory constitutes a historical example of successful prediction and 
explanation without truth and hence a problematic case for defenders of IBE – that is to say, for most 
proponents of other versions of SR, but not for the proponent of TSR. 
26 All this does not exclude the possibility of a fictional scenario something like this:  Lavoisier is not 
around or at any rate does not coin the term ‘oxygen’; as tensions grow in the experiments on 
phlogiston somebody makes the bold proposal that phlogiston is actually not given off in combustion, 
but acquired, and that it is present in normal air; that phlogiston has nothing to do with the shiny 
appearance of metals but instead affects their appearance when metals get “phlogisticated” (oxidized); 
and so on.  In such a scenario a referential practice for ‘phlogiston’ might have been successfully 
established, in which the word refers to what we now call oxygen.  Chang (2012) argues that had 
‘phlogiston’ been retained, it might have come to refer to chemical potential energy, or perhaps to free 
electrons.  That referential practices can stabilize, after a period of initial indeterminacy, in more than 
one way, is consistent both with the causal-historical approach to reference and with TSR. 
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to the same thing, the uses of the term refer to that thing. That success is not dependent 
on what is in anyone’s head. 
The descriptivist may insist: this is a deeply unsatisfactory view about reference: you do 
not know if you are referring nor, if you do, to what. It all depends on whether someone 
was lucky and their original introduction or subsequent uses managed to connect term 
and referent. So, successful reference depends on some form of referential luck. But 
observe that whenever an external condition is constitutive of the success of a process or 
an action, the agent’s point of view is not sufficient to gauge the success. For instance, the 
justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge introduces an external element to the 
epistemic success of knowing vs. merely believing: truth, an element that in general 
cannot be determined just by looking into one’s mental states. The situation as regards 
reference is no different. 
  
5. Implications for perspectival scientific realism 
In recent years a number of philosophers of science have advocated views that can be 
grouped under the umbrella term ‘perspectivism’, and some of these (e.g., Giere (2006), 
Teller (2020) and Massimi (2018)) advocate views that merit the more specific label 
‘perspectival scientific realism’ (PSR).  As is almost always the case, each philosopher has 
their own specific set of views that are not quite the same as those of any other 
philosopher, and this makes characterizing the varieties PSR difficult.  We will not 
attempt this task, but rather mention some characteristic claims that one can find 
advocated by one or more proponent of PSR, in order to get a feel for the view, before 
making some closing remarks about how TSR compares to PSR, particularly in light of the 
considerations about reference developed in section 4. 
Perspectivism can be seen as opposed to a “view from nowhere” understanding of 
scientific knowledge.  In a variety of ways, scientific knowledge is to be understood as 
perspective-bound or perspective-relative.  In particular, it is to be understood as 
thoroughly historical (that is, it emerges in specific human communities and from specific 
historical - hence, contingent - goals, concerns, concepts and practices). Nevertheless, the 
advocate of PSR maintains that science certainly gives us truths, but always from within a 
perspective.  But once one has mentioned the perspectival qualification, one can go on to 
say that some bits of scientific lore, even about unobservable entities, are really true.  For 
example, from the perspective characteristic of 20th century Western chemistry, it is 
simply true to say that diamonds are made of carbon atoms bound together in a certain 
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type of crystalline configuration - full stop.  But we are not to take this as a universal 
truth that somehow transcends any or all perspectives. 
We find many of the things that perspectivists say to be clearly right and also 
unproblematic from the broader standpoint of defending a non-trivial form of scientific 
realism.  We acknowledge that the meaning of scientific terms gets shaped through 
historical processes, by people with certain aims and certain existing ideas and practices at 
their disposal.  We also acknowledge a point stressed by Teller (2020): scientific realists 
advocate belief in the truth-or-approximate-truth of certain parts of scientific lore, but 
the very notion (vague) of ‘approximate’ truth can only be understood relative to certain 
goals and interests, i.e., from a perspective.  
That said, arguably, perspectives bear some family resemblance to Kuhnian paradigms, 
and it may be tempting to read the claim that scientific statements are perspective-bound 
as similar, if not identical, to Kuhn’s claim of the incommensurability of the meanings of 
(similar- or identical-looking) statements made within very different paradigms.27  If that 
is the intention, then we wish to point out that the inadequacy of descriptivism (and the 
closely related Kuhn-Feyerabend holism we discussed in section 3) as accounts of 
meaning and reference suggests limitations on the extent to which it is right to see 
scientific statements as perspective-bound.   
If one starts from a holist or a descriptivist notion of what determines the reference of 
natural kind and property terms used in science, it is natural to think that when two 
communities with quite different perspectives and beliefs both assert a sentence like 
‘Electrons have rest mass me’, despite superficial appearances they are neither saying the 
same thing, nor necessarily either agreeing or disagreeing with each other.  One 
community may associate the key terms ‘electron’, ‘mass’ with very different descriptions 
than the other, and connect these terms with different complexes of theoretical belief.  
But if the causal-historical account is, as we believe, the right way to understand the 
reference of many terms in scientific discourse, then our scientific language (and also the 
language of everyday life) possesses certain “pitons” that anchor our discourse firmly to 
reality outside of our heads.   
As we made clear in section 2, TSR claims that the existence of electrons is now beyond 
doubt (barring radical skepticism), and let us suppose that the same can be said about the 
 
27 This similarity is noted by many writers on perspectivism, and no doubt explains why advocates 
take pains to point out that perspectivism is not simply a form of truth relativism. 
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fact that there is a natural property/magnitude that we call ‘rest mass’. 28 Then, even 
though it remains possible that we will in the future dramatically change some of our 
theoretical beliefs about electrons, and about rest mass, nevertheless the statement 
‘Electrons exist and have rest mass me’ is no longer hostage to our theoretical beliefs, nor 
in any important sense perspective-bound.  It is instead an objective fact about our world, 
in as strong a sense as any scientific realist should hope for.   
To say this is not to deny that there may be many statements - perhaps even a majority - 
in science whose meanings are in part fixed by holism-style connections to other parts of 
accepted lore and by the practices and interests of the relevant community.  But it is 
important also to acknowledge that the causal-historical approach to reference imposes a 
certain amount of externalism, giving us a partial grip at least on reality that is 
independent of our current concepts and perspectives.  
The considerations about meaning and reference we raised in sections 3 and 4 above, 
together with the central claims of TSR, militate against some of the more radical 
interpretations of perspectivist theses, those that are close to a Kuhnian/constructivist 
view; but they are, we believe, perfectly compatible with many moderate perspectivist 
theses.  We believe that perspectivism can coexist perfectly well with the causal-
historical approach to reference, and even with TSR, but it will be tempered with a 
somewhat greater amount of trans-perspectival truth than its adherents might currently 
expect. 
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